A high-level radioactive waste will be disposed of into deep geological formations, to isolate it from the human environment.
I INTRODUCTION
Nuclear facilities are subjected to, before their constructions and operations, safety review by a national regulatory body to show through safety assessment that the facilities, under both normal and accidental conditions, will do not cause any unacceptable level of radiological consequences on the public. A nuclear waste repository, among other facilities, has specific features. A nuclear power plant, for instance, should finally be decommissioned legally and also physically after the termination of a preset life-time of the plant which is normally several tens of years. It might therefore be required to demonstrate safety of the plant before licensing and during at least its operational period.
The repository in which radioactive wastes are emplaced may also be decommissioned after the institutional control terminates, i. e. , the repository undergoes from a storage stage into a disposal stage.
The institutional control on a disposal site, while its necessity may depend on types of the repository concepts, may be assumed, for in particular a shallow land disposal concept, to be continued for a few hundred years at most after the repository is finally closed. Radioactive wastes, in particular a high-level radioactive waste (HLW), contain long-lived radionuclides such as 99TC, 1291, 135Cs and transuranic elements, may not be retrieved, and thus may remain as the source of radiological consequences for a long time even after the facility transfers from the operational stage to the disposal stage. Radiological conDepartment of Environmental Safety Research, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute; Tokai, Naka, Ibaraki 319-11, Japan. sequences on the public from the disposal system which may be provided with redundant engineered and natural barriers, are potentially expected to appear only after a long period of time and may be associated in the far future with the timedependent degradation of the engineered barriers and with the migration of radionuclides in the natural barriers to the human environment.
The long-term impact from the waste to be disposed of inevitably produces a specific requirement, from the standpoint of radiation protection, that both present and future generations, without any limitation of time, should in principle be protected at a level consistent with that accorded by the current radiation protection standards and criteria. This requirement may cause the following questions :
(a) how to formulate the safety criteria, based on the radiation protection principles, to be applied to the repository in judging the longterm acceptability, and (b) how to demonstrate compliance with the safety criteria. Safety criteria to be applied to the disposal of HLW have not been established until now in Japan. However, a wide veriety of nuclear facilities, including a disposal facility (a long-term storage facility) for a low-level radioactive waste (LLW), have been subjected to regulatory procedures and licensed in accordance with existing regulatory framework. It might therefore be reasonable to postulate that the prevailing regulatory framework which based on the current radiation protection principles should in principle be applied to the repository of HLW, while some modifications will be required to take into account possible long-term consequences from HLW.
The requirement for the demonstration of compliance with the criteria, however, may cause problems specific to the disposal of HLW. Since the safety of the repository can not be directly demonstrated through experimental measurements, it is reasonably recognized in a waste management community that the safety has to be indirectly demonstrated through safety assessment by using predictive models and data. A key issue in judging compliance will be that, in view of uncertainties associated with such a long-term assessment, the quality of the assessment inevitably depends on the current level of understanding of the disposal system and also the quality of models and data to be used.
We have discussed in this paper on key relating to the safety criteria and compliance with the criteria, such as numerical guides to indicate radiological consequences, time frames over which calculations of the consequences are to be carried out and uncertainties to be involved in the calculations.
II OBJECTIVES OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL
Objectives of radioactive waste disposal are, as stated in OECD/NEA document, l) to:
-protect human health, -protect the environment, and --minimize any burden placed on future generations, while, at the same time, taking into account social and economic factors.
The first requirement (protection of human health) is directly concerned with radiation protection and harmonized with the current nuclear safety regulation system, and later discussed in detail. The second requirement (protection of the environment) aims at the protection of natural resources and living organism except for human, and therefore, is beyond the scope of this paper. The third requirement is mainly concerned with HLW and a long-lived radioactive waste, and consists mainly of three items2) having a particular feature different from each other :
(a) Radioactive wastes shall be sifely disposed of at an appropriate time, taking into account technical, social and economic factors. (b) The safety of the repository in the postclosure period, in particular HLW case, shall not rely on long-term institutional controls as a necessary safety measure. (c) The safety of the repository shall be such that there are no predicted future risks to human health which would not be accepted today. This will be discussed later on. The first item is purely based on an ethical consideration that the present generation who benefits directly from the current exploitation of nuclear energy should bear the financial burden associated with the implementation of waste disposal. This principle may enhance scientific and technical efforts in the current generation, aiming at the implementation of safe disposal. However, it should not be interpreted too rigidly, taking into account the fact that the benefits obtained from the current utilization of nuclear energy will be passed on to future generations through the improvements in scientific, technical and life standards.
In any case, timing of waste disposal will be subjected to a number of technical and socioeconomic considerations.
2)
The second item requires to minimize, for future generations, the burden associated with waste disposal, through the selection of an appropriate disposal concepts so as to ensure that these generations do not need to take any action to protect themselves from the effect of the disposal. (a) No practice involving exposures to radiation shall be adopted unless it produces a sufficient benefit to the exposed individuals or to society to offset the radiation detriment it causes (the justification of a practice).
(b) The magnitude of individual doses, the number of people exposed, and the likelihood of incurring exposures, where these are not certain to be received, should be kept as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), economic and social factors being taken into account (the optimization of protcetion). This procedure should be constrained by restrictions on the doses to individuals (dose constraints), or the risks to individuals in the case of potential exposures (risk constraints), so as to limit the inequity. (c) The exposure of individuals resulting from the combination of all the relevant practices should be subjected to dose limit, or to some control of risks in the case of potential exposures (individual dose and risks). These are aimed at ensuring that no individual is exposed to radiation risk that are judged to be unacceptable from these practices in any normal circumstances. There may be a general consensus that the first principle (justification) refers to an entire practice rather than to each part of it. Thus it is not necessary to justify waste disposal in isolation from the practice as a whole.
Many international recommendations and guidelines have been published on radiation protection for the disposal of radioactive wastes, e. g.; tection Objectives for Radioactive Waste. "6} A key consensus generally observed in the publications is that individuals and populations in the future should be accorded at least a current level of the protection. Generally accepted principles for radiation protection following the disposal of radioactive wastes are thus summarized as follows:
-Optimization of protection (ALARA) -Limitation of individual doses or risks -Protection of future generations The last principle may be a sort of derivatives of the second one, but it may be worthwhile to note it separately taking into account the long-term nature of radiological consequences resulting from the implementation of HLW disposal. These principles should in general be applied, during regulatory procedures, to the repository of HLW.
IV NUMERICAL CRITERIA A theoretical framework on "the limitation of dose and risk" has been developed by ICRP, based on the risk concept, and recommended that the limit for the public exposure should be expressed as an effective dose of 1 mSv in a year, as the sum of all relevant doses.
The individual dose limits recommended by ICRP intend to apply to likely events to be involved in normal scenarios, and do not apply directly to potential exposures resulting from less likely events which are involved in a set of disruptive scenarios. The normal scenarios correspond to the extrapolation into the future of present and past geological and environmental trends analyzed through predictive geological and environmental studies, due account being taken of the interactions between waste, structural materials and the host rock. These scenarios are assessed on the basis that they occur, i. e. , the probability of occurrence is one.
On the other hand, the disruptive scenarios treat events which have the potential to cause direct release of radionuclides to the biosphere.
Examples of such events are meteorite impact, magmatic activity, tectonic displacement or glacial erosion of such amplitude as to cause direct exposure. Ideally, the individual dose limits should be supplemented by risk limits, taking into account of both the possibility of incurring a dose and the detriment associated with that dose if it were to be received.
The individual risk limit, 10-5, recommended by ICRP is consistent with the risk implied by the dose limit mentioned above. The current national regulation involves the concept of individual dose as a fundamental measure of the safety of nuclear facilities. A numerical value of the dose limit for public exposures is the same as that recommended by ICRP.
As to potential exposures resulting from, for instance, a reactor accident is taken into account during the national safety review for the sitting of a nuclear power plant. In a case of the power plant, a tentative numerical guide to be considered in the acceptability of the sitting is 0. 25 Sv to the whole body for a hypothetical nuclear accident.
The dose objective, as specified in the safety review guidance, applied to the nuclear facility under normal circumstances is 50 , uSv in a year.
This framework of radiological requirement is actively applied to the licensed nuclear facilities in operation. The dose objective aiming at the exemption from regulatory controls is 10iSv in a year which is now applied only to a shallow land disposal facility which receives the wastes specified by the relevant law, at the point of time when it undergoes from the storage stage to the disposal stage. It may be logical to assume that the current regulatory system should in general be applied to the repository of HLW, while some modification of the current system will be required so as to ensure that future generations should in principle be protected at a level corresponding to the current safety level. This may be consistent to the fact that the objectives of radiation protection is the same among nuclear facilities.
In correspondence with the need to take into account the protection of future generations, the risk limit, 10-5, may be applied to the potential exposures resulting from a set of scenarios that are certain or even less likely to occur, as was recommended by ICRP. 4) Beside the risk limit, risk objectives corresponding to dose objectives should be established by the relevant national authority based on the same philosophy adopted to the procedures in the derivation of the dose objectives mentioned above.
A HLW repository has particular features compared with the other nuclear facilities, i. e. , a nuclear power plant, as shown in Table 1 . However, there may still be an apparent analogy between the repository and nuclear power plant.
As mentioned above, there may be common tendency4,7) to treat normal scenarios within the framework of a dose limit, separate from a set of disruptive scenarios which are subjected to a risk limit.
This may lead an analogy between them, whereby normal scenarios correspond to planned discharges and disruptive scenarios are analogous to accidental releases from the plant.
This, in effect, may draw that potential exposures from probabilistic scenarios involving such events as human intrusion into the repository or large scale environmental change can be treated in a similar manner as those due to potential severe accidents of the plant. In the case of the accident if once it occurs, public exposures should be controlled by intervention levels, whereas the events causing potential exposures can only be controlled by limiting the probability of occurrence in a disposal system.
The radiation protection criteria for the plant in the accident case, 0. 25 Sv, do not applied directly to the repository in cases of low-probability disruptive evolutions.
The analogy with the plant can more usefully be applied to the treatment the probability of occurrence of less likely events, as is extensively conducted in a probabilistic safety assessment of a nuclear power plant to evaluate the probability in a case of a nuclear power plant by an extensive cost-benefit analysis of the available technical alternatives to obtain an optimal balancing between radiological consequences and economic costs. As was pointed out at NEA workshop on "Radiation Protection and Safety Criteria""} held on 1990, however, "a detailed quantitative optimization procedure dealing with long-term situations is severely constrained and does not usually play a major rote in the decision-making process related to the disposal of radioactive waste." The reasons of this may be summarized as follows.8> (a) The safety level of the repository may be so high that it may go beyond what would result from a strict optimization.
(b) Significant releases of radionuclides might occur owing to potential disruptive geological events (probabilistic events), and their probability which is the bases of the prediction of radiological consequences is normally considered low but difficult to estimate with precision. (c) Quantitative optimization requires, as a prerequisite, detailed information on system performance and system cost. For political, economic and resource reasons, however, comprehensive site evaluations which may afford such the information will only be undertaken for a very limited number of sites. It may be concluded from these considerations that although the optimization principle remains valid for the disposal of HLW and should be implemented if necessary by using appropriate measures to be compared, this requirement may be relaxed, if it is demonstrated through predictive safety assessment that the individual dose or risk attributable to a specific site dose not exceed a dose or risk objective. The reason of this is that the objectives were established, taking into account ALARA principle in advance, to be significantly lower levels than the dose limits as mentioned before. It should be recognized, however, that a qualitative or quantitative optimization may include in the design of repository concepts because it involves a number of technically detailed options.
V COMPLIANCE WITH CRITERIA The demonstration that a repository proposed complies with radiological protection criteria is undertaken within licensing procedures. This has to be performed only through safety assessment, although associated with inevitably large uncertainties, using predictive models and data. The Table 1 Specific features of nuclear waste repository compared with a nuclear power plant.
fundamental safety principles require as mentioned above that all future generations should be accorded at least a current level of the protection. Key issues in the procedures demonstrating compliance with the criteria are8>: -the time frame over which calculations of radiological consequences are to be performed, -uncertainty which exists as a result of the inherent unpredictability of random process (objective uncertainty), and which arises from the fact that human knowledge of any complex system will be incomplete (subjective uncertainty), 7) and -the quality of predictive models and data. The last two items dominate the reliability of assessment results, and thus the assurance of compliance with the criteria.
1. Time frames The assessment of long-term safety first requires the identification of various potential mechanisms by which radionuclides are released from a repository, transported through the various barriers into the human environment, and brought about radiation exposures either directly or indirectly. Once these are identified, calculations can be performed by using predictive models and data, which are based on the characterization of a disposal system, of radiological consequences on the public. The time frames over which calculations are to be undertaken have been subjected to serious debates among a nuclear waste management community. (a) The fundamental radiation protection principles should be time invariant. to conduct quantitative assessments up to at least 10, 000 years, i. e, those in Canada, Germany and the United States. 8> The consideration that assessment extending into the very far future is inevitably subjected to a large uncertainty, however, does not rationalize to introduce such "cutoff" times, e. g. , 10, 000 years.
The statement by the National Radiological Protection Board') pertinently pointed out that "For a deep repository, however, the time until activity first reaches the biosphere may be considerably greater than 10, 000 years, and therefore a cut-off at 10, 000 years does not seem appropriate. " These considerations, however, do not mean that assessments should be extended into the very far future, and should further give quantitative consequences with a consistent level of detail. These rather intend to mean that cut-off times should be regarded as transition points on detail of the assessment.
With this in mind it may be recommended that characteristic of assessment should be gradually changed from quantitative to qualitative evaluation as the time scale of assessments increases, to take into account that uncertainties associated with prediction increases with time. This may be reflected from the fact that the available scientific basis for prediction will decrease with increasing the time scale of prediction.
To avoid the difficulty in the long-term assessment, it is natural to begin thinking about an alternative measure to be used in judging the acceptability of repositories in the far future that relates to an increase, attributable to HLW disposal, in radioactivity in the human environment or in the geological environment. This approach is based on a model of the predicted chemical form of radionuclides remaining in the waste or dispersed through the rock and groundwater at particular times in the future, and hence their potential availability for mobilization into the biosphere compared with their natural relatives. 9 The acceptability may be judged by comparison with local variations in background radioactivity, and the forms and mobilities of natural radionuclides in associated groundwater. This approach, however, does not seem consistent with the current national regulation system in which fissile materials, once they are brought into a nuclear fuel cycle, and the radionuclides produced in the cycle are pertinently distinguished from natural radionuclides, i. e. radiological consequences from nuclear facilities are treated separately from those attributable to natural radiation sources. This may be harmonized with ICRP recommendation3> that the component of public exposure due to natural resource is by far the largest, but this provides no justification for reducing the attention paid to smaller, but more readily controlled, exposure to artificial sources.
Should uncertainties inherently involved in the long-term assessments be considered, it may be worthwhile dividing the future into several time frames, corresponding to the availability and reliability of scientific information which are obtained from experiments and observations.
The results of a number of safety assessments on a deep geologic disposal system clearly indicate that insignificant radiological consequences could be expected over relatively short time span up to ten thousands of years, reflecting from the travel time of groundwater from the repository to the biosphere being so long at most sites that an insignificant radionuclides transport would be predicted over this time frame.10-12) In this time frame, from the closure of repository to 10, 000 years, underlying chemical, physical and geological mechanisms that potentially affect the release and transport of radionuclides from the repository to the biosphere can be identified, with more or less confidence, through experimental studies. Although changes in the biosphere and human society will be expected depending on time elapsed within this time frame; i. e. , the longer time elapsed the higher uncertainties being anticipated, the geological environment may be less likely to alter significantly. To avoid complexity in dealing with a biosphere model, which will be appropriate to take into account possible time-dependent changes in the biosphere and human society, safety assessments dealing with this time frame are recommended to base on site-specific models for both the geosphere and biosphere. It is also suggested to use a relatively detailed source-term model, taking into account that some barriers involved in the repository will remain, more or less extent; to play as chemical and/or physical confinement. Consequences obtained with assessments should be compared with the system of dose limitation for normal scenarios, and the risk limitation system for intrusion scenarios. Assessments in this time frame may exclude a set of disruptive scenarios involving low probability events except for human intrusions. The reason to incorporate intrusion scenarios in this time frame is that the documents concerned with a specific repository may be lost beyond a few hundred years, even though human intrusions into a deep repository are less likely to occur.
Within the next time frame, 104-106 years, a large-scale alteration in the biosphere and human society are likely to occur, while the geological environment will still keep the current situations. Uncertainties associated with assessments for this time scale are expected so extensive that site specific assessments, assuming the current conditions in the biosphere and human society remaining relatively unchanged throughout the time scale, may not be justified, while it may be possible to perform generic evaluations using a so-called "reference biosphere" and "reference society."
It is impossible to obtain detailed information, with a sufficient reliability, on the biosphere and human society in this time scale. With this in mind, it may be unavoidable to assume that if the reference society is demonstrated through predictive assessments to receive acceptable radiological consequences, then any individuals actually existed will also be afforded a level corresponding to the current safety level. Assessment should be focused on the geosphere which still allows relatively reliable predictions in the movement of groundwater and the transport of radionuclides, and should in principle be based on a generic biosphere model and a less detailed source-term model. Significant consequences expected in this time frame may be attributable to disruptive scenarios involving less likely probabilistic events, and then the consequences thus obtained should be expressed in a term of risk. Ideally, the document of assessments should also provide the components of both a dose and a probability to receive such dose. It is worthwhile to point out that public perception of low consequence, high probability events tends to differ fundamentally from that of high consequence, low probability events. ' Beyond 106 years, large-scale changes will be expected to occur in the geosphere, biosphere and also human society, so that scientific basis upon which assessments are performed may be subjected to considerable uncertainties. Any assessment, even if a generic modelling approach is used for the biosphere and human society, giving quantitative consequences is therefore unlikely to be justified. Assessments in this time frame should be focused on qualitative evaluations to demonstrate a sufficient ability of a specific disposal system to isolate the waste, and identify major mechanisms to alter significantly the release and transport of radionuclides, taking into account potential time-dependent changes in geological, hydrological and geochemical behavior of the isolation system.
In spite of general consensus being observed that the level of protection to be afforded to future generations ought to be at least analogous to that to the current generation, there are considerable debates on the time period over which assessments are to be performed, reflecting from the differences existed in translating the radiation protection principles into quantitative criteria. There are two extreme thoughts in this area:
(a) Dose and/or risk limits should be applied without any limitation of time, with in mind that predictions are stylized and do not intend to give actual doses and/or risks based on accurate simulations of all the mechanisms concerned, but give only practical measures devised to demonstrate compliance with the criteria. (b) Dose and/or risk limits should be applied within time frames, e. g. , 10, 000 years following disposal, for which predictions can be made with a sufficient confidence, with in mind that predictions extended over the far future are questionable because of associated large uncertainties. As pointed out by M. D. HILL,") differences of opinion on this issue do not seem to be in the underlying principles, but may be ascribed to confusion between information about repository assessment which is required to demonstrate compliance wiht criteria, and other information needed to explain and support disposal programs in fora wider than radiation protection and waste management communities.
It should be emphasized that detailed quantitative assessments could be justified within the time frames for which scientific information required for assessment could be available with a sufficient confidence, and less detailed quantitative and qualitative assessments could be used for the far future. It is also worthwhile to note that the result of assessments, i. e. , radiological consequences, when quantitative assessment sare performed, should be documented together with the probability of occurrence of such consequences to be received and uncertainties associated with the result, and also the way in which criteria are formulated and interpreted.
2, Uncertainties
The results of assessments inevitably involve uncertainties coming from, e. g. : Protection and Safety Assessment Aspects of HLW-disposal 281
-scenario uncertainties, -conceptual model uncertainties, -mathematical model uncertainties, and -parameter uncertainties.
Most portions of these uncertainties may be ascribed to things that are unknowable about the future and an imperfect knowledge of any complex system, and may be intrinsic to the process of trying to conceptualize, model and measure a system on the basis of a finite amount of information currently available. These uncertainties, except for uncertainties due to inherent unpredictability of random processes, are therefore possible to reduce significantly by the implementation of :
-a quality assurance program on scenario analysis, modelling, coding and data acquisition, -an intercomparison exercise to verify codes and validate models and data, and -a peer review by a number of experts in various fields concerned. However, it is recognized that since uncertainties in safety assessments can never be eliminated, uncertainty analyses should be undertaken in conjunction with safety assessments, and uncertainties involved in the results should be quantified to the extent possible. In practice, parameter uncertainties may easily be quantified through a stochastic methodology in which distributions of parameter values (probability distribution functions) are directly introduced into calculations to determine a distribution of the output. Uncertainties involved in scenarios and models are not easily quantifiable, and then should be subjected to an extensive quality assurance program, and also to a peer review for scenarios and to validation studies for models.
VI CONCLUDING REMARKS
Safe disposal of radioactive wastes is one of the essential milestones to complete a nuclear fuel cycle. It might be necessary to establish safety crrteria for HLW disposal so as to enable the implementation of assessment of radiological consequences and the judgement of acceptability of HLW disposal. Existing regulatory framework has been developed taking into account a relatively short-term release of radionuclides from a nuclear installation, but might be applicable for HLW disposal with some modifications to deal with the long-term radiological consequences attributable to HLW disposal. One of essential alterations to the current regulation system might be the introduction of risk limits and risk objectives which enable to regulate consequences from a set of scenarios that are certain or even less likely to occur.
One of the major safety requirements for HLW disposal might be that the future generations should be accorded at least a current level of protection. This requirement inevitably necessitates that the time scale over which safety assessment are to be conducted should be divided several time frames, reflecting from the fact that the availability and reliability of scientific bases for which calculations are implemented might decrease with an increase in time in the future. 
